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OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jean Robert Nerius pled guilty to resisting or impeding 
correctional employees, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), 
and damaging property within special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1363.  Nerius was originally sentenced as a career offender to 
37 months’ imprisonment but, following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), 
was resentenced to 36 months.  Nerius claims that his new 
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sentence is presumptively vindictive under North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), because it falls at the upper end 
of the non-career offender Guideline range, while his original 
sentence was at the lower end of the career offender range.  
Because his revised sentence was lower than that originally 
imposed, Pearce’s presumption of judicial vindictiveness does 
not apply, nor is there any evidence of actual vindictiveness, 
and thus we will affirm. 
 
I 
 
 While in custody at the United States Penitentiary in 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, Nerius committed several offenses.  
In one incident, he bit a correctional employee’s finger.  In a 
separate incident, he broke the sprinkler head in his cell, 
causing the area to flood.  Nerius was charged with, among 
other things, resisting correctional officers and damaging 
property in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and 1363, 
respectively, and he pled guilty to both counts.1     
 
 The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) 
calculated a base offense level of 14, which was increased to 
17 because the § 111(a)(1) charge was deemed a crime of 
violence and, due to his criminal record, qualified Nerius as a 
career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Nerius then received 
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under 
§ 3E1.1.  As a result, Nerius had a total offense level of 14, a 
criminal history category of VI, and faced an advisory 
Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment.    
 
                                              
 1 Under the terms of Nerius’s plea agreement, the 
Government dismissed two other counts.   
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 Nerius objected to his designation as a career offender, 
arguing that his violation of § 111(a) does not constitute a 
crime of violence under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2).  
The District Court rejected this argument.  
 
 Nerius then sought a downward variance based on his 
“exemplary behavior” in prison since August 2013.  App. 72.  
He acknowledged that he had numerous disciplinary incidents 
in prison but, since being charged with these crimes, he had 
remained “completely incident free at a very high level 
security institution with very strict conditions,” demonstrating 
post-offense rehabilitation.  Id.  The Government opposed a 
variance, arguing that the District Court could reward this 
“recent good behavior” with a within-Guidelines sentence.  
App. 77.  The District Court considered Nerius’s violent 
actions in the context of his “long history with the criminal 
justice system,” App. 79, acknowledged that Nerius had 
recently improved his behavior, and on that basis found “that 
a sentence at the bottom of the [career offender] guideline 
range is reasonable, appropriate, and is not greater than 
necessary to meet sentencing objectives.”  Id.  It therefore 
imposed a 37-month sentence on each count, to be served 
concurrently.2  Nerius appealed. 
 
 While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held 
that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act is 
void for vagueness.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.  Because § 
4B1.2(a)(2) contains a similar residual clause, the 
Government determined that Johnson applied to § 4B1.2 and 
                                              
 2 The concurrent 37-month sentences were to be served 
consecutively to a sentence Nerius was already serving for a 
drug conviction.   
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filed an unopposed motion to vacate and remand Nerius’s 
case for resentencing, which this Court granted.  See Order, 
United States v. Nerius, No. 14-4121 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2015).   
 
 At resentencing, the District Court adopted the 
Government’s position that Nerius no longer qualified as a 
career offender and determined that his revised total offense 
level was 12 and his criminal history category remained VI, 
yielding a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months’ 
imprisonment.  Nerius again sought a variance to either a 
below-Guidelines sentence or a sentence at the bottom of the 
revised range, emphasizing his continued good behavior in 
prison.  The Government maintained that a within-Guidelines 
sentence was appropriate.  The District Court discussed the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and Nerius’s history 
and characteristics, including his record of good behavior, 
found “a sentence at the high end of the [non-career offender] 
guideline range to be reasonable, appropriate and not greater 
than necessary to meet sentencing objectives,” and sentenced 
Nerius to a 36-month term on each count, to be served 
concurrently.3  App. 110.  Nerius appeals, arguing that his 
revised sentence triggered the Pearce presumption of judicial 
vindictiveness and thereby violated due process because, at 
his initial sentencing, he was sentenced at the bottom of the 
then-applicable Guideline range, and at his resentencing, he 
was sentenced near the top of the revised range. 
                                              
 3 Immediately after the District Court announced the 
sentence, Nerius unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the 
sentence.   
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II4 
 
 “Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness 
against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first 
conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after 
a new trial.”  Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.  Under Pearce and its 
progeny, when a defendant receives a higher sentence after 
having exercised his due process rights to appeal, a 
presumption of vindictiveness applies, “which may be 
overcome only by objective information in the record 
justifying the increased sentence.”  United States v. Goodwin, 
457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982).  The Pearce presumption does not 
apply “when the aggregate [revised] sentence is less than that 
originally imposed and there is no evidence of vindictiveness 
on the part of the sentencing court.”  Kelly v. Neubert, 898 
F.2d 15, 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting Pearce claim where, 
on remand, sentencing court increased sentences on several 
individual counts but reduced overall sentence); see United 
States v. Murray, 144 F.3d 270, 275 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
Pearce claim where defendant’s “new sentences on the drug 
counts do not exceed the total length of his original sentence” 
and there was no evidence of actual vindictiveness).  Where 
the presumption does not apply, an appellant must provide 
“proof of actual vindictiveness” by the sentencing judge at 
resentencing to support a claim of judicial vindictiveness.  
Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1258 (3d Cir. 1992) (en 
banc), abrogated on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619 (1993).    
                                              
 4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
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 The Pearce presumption focuses on whether the length 
of the new sentence exceeds the total length of the original 
sentence.  Because of this focus, the fact that two sentences 
may fall in different relative positions within the original and 
revised Guideline ranges is irrelevant.  Under Pearce, we use 
the actual sentence imposed following the appeal as a litmus 
test for the presence or absence of vindictiveness and do not 
require  the resentencing process to mirror the original 
proceeding.  Kelly, 898 F.2d at 16.  As a result, for Pearce 
purposes, the District Court is not obligated to impose a 
sentence at the bottom of the revised range simply because its 
original sentence was at the bottom of the then-applicable 
range.  Here, while Nerius’s new sentence fell at a different 
point in the revised sentencing guideline range, he in fact 
received a shorter sentence at resentencing, and thus the 
presumption is not triggered.  See id.    
 
 Moreover, Nerius does not raise, nor do we discern a 
basis for, a claim of actual vindictiveness.  The District Court 
explained that Nerius’s criminal history and extensive prison 
disciplinary record, which included dozens of incidents 
between 2005 and 2013 while he was serving his nearly 16-
year sentence, weighed against his two-year record of good 
behavior, and justified a 36-month sentence. 
 
 For these reasons, the reduced sentence is not subject 
to the Pearce presumption.  That, “coupled with the absence 
of anything to indicate [actual] vindictiveness[,] . . . satisfies 
us” that the lower 36-month sentence was proper.  Id. at 18.  
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III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence. 
